While Germany has many large multinational companies like BMW,
Volkswagen, and Siemens that turn in strong performance, its small and
medium-size enterprises (SMEs) are an impressive source of strength, both as
suppliers to multinational corporations and as exporters in their own right.
These SMEs generally avoid mass markets, but they dominate niche
businesses. A 2007 study by the management consultant Bernd Venohr found that
more than 1,130 German SMEs held either the number one or two position in the
world market for their products, or the number one position in the European
market. They are rarely the cheapest producers, yet the superior quality and
performance of their products enables them to command premium prices and still
boost exports. In the United States, such small and medium firms were hurt most
by Chinese competition and the recession.
An important factor in German SME
manufacturing success is the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft (Fraunhofer
Society), an independent nongovernmental organization that provides
high-quality, short-term, affordable applied research that small and
medium-size firms could not otherwise afford. Fraunhofer enables smaller
manufacturers to continually upgrade their processes and products, and keep ahead
of the competition.
A key feature of Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft is its scale; it is a
$2.45-billion enterprise that operates more than 60 research institutes with
more than 250 business focus areas and core competencies. The average institute
employs between 300 and 400 people, though some are much larger. Overall, it
has about 22,000 employees.
The society's mission is to conduct
applied research with practical industrial value. It sees itself as a bridge
between the latest university insights and industry-specific product and process improvements. It also generates a great deal of knowledge in its own
laboratories.
Fraunhofer institutes undertake 6,000 to 8,000 projects annually. Most
are small, short-term efforts. Projects rarely last longer than two years and
focus on immediate, applicable results. Because Fraunhofer's funding has
steadily grown over the years, it has been able work with its industry partners
to generate the incremental improvements that translate into sustained
competitive advantages.
While Fraunhofer is an independent nongovernmental entity, its distributed
structure keeps it focused on practical results. Each Fraunhofer institute is
linked with a German university. The institutes pick their own research fields,
select their own projects, and decide how to handle project results.
More important, institutes balance their own budgets. That means
generating contract research, which accounts for up to two thirds of the
Fraunhofer budget. In addition to its scale and distribution structure, there
are several other factors that account for Fraunhofer's success:
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Together, Fraunhofer's 60 institutes specialize in more than 250
research areas. Each institute is paired with a university with similar
research interests. The institutes themselves are very well equipped. Most
operate multiple pilot manufacturing lines and demonstration facilities. The
German machine tool industry often provides equipment for testing and training,
so the Fraunhofer tool set is current and the firms using it receive valuable
feedback.
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Fraunhofer's model is a classic government-industry partnership. The
federal and state governments, private contract research, and publicly funded
contract research each provide roughly one-third of its funding. The reality is
more complex, since a substantial amount of "industry" research can
be funded through government grants and incentives.
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Even if the private sector share is sometimes overstated, it is the
stability of the funding that is important. German political parties usually
consider support of applied research, of direct relevance to their companies,
to be a part of the national infrastructure, like water or electricity.
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A great advantage of the German innovation system is the emphasis on
vocational education that combines academic studies with factory
apprenticeships. This continues to yield a highly trained and technologically
adept work force that is the envy of the world. Fraunhofer mirrors this dual
system at the highest educational levels. It employs part-time post-docs and
master’s and Ph.D. candidates, who acquire practical experience while
simultaneously pursuing their studies. Graduates typically spend from three to
six years at Fraunhofer before moving on to positions in industry or academia.
This ensures a ready supply of well-trained researchers with hands-on
experience in critical industrial technologies.
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Fraunhofer holds the rights to thousands of patents and registrations.
It ordinarily retains patent and other IP rights upon conclusion of a research
project.
SMEs are often called the
Mittelstand, or "middle class," but the two terms are not synonymous.
The Mittelstand is a subset of German SMEs with certain distinct
characteristics. They are typically family businesses located in small towns
and rural areas. Their roots stretch back for many decades, often generations,
and they plan for the very long term. As community leaders, their strong sense
of social obligation makes them less likely to outsource or move offshore.
Companies of the Mittelstand generally focus on niche products and markets,
rather than go head to head with multinational giants. In many cases, continual
incremental improvements in products and production methods have enabled them
to dominate their chosen specialties.
In 2008, roughly one-third of Fraunhofer's R&D projects involved
firms with fewer than 250 employees, while 43% were with companies with fewer
than 1,000 employees. Without Fraunhofer, it seems that many of these firms
would not have remained as competitive in global markets.
Fraunhofer also works with such large, vertically integrated
corporations as Siemens, Daimler-Benz, and Volkswagen. Research projects with
large companies tend to last longer, involve more institutes, and bring in more
revenue than SME contracts.
Limits and Lessons
German manufacturers have realized many successes. Not only do their
multinational companies thrive in an increasingly competitive global market,
but their SMEs often dominate their market niches. Yet Germany's innovation
system is not a perfect model. It has significant weaknesses, and its strengths
may not translate easily to other cultures.
Fraunhofer's most glaring weakness arises from its greatest strength:
Its laser-like focus on established industries has kept it from pioneering new
technologies. There are no German counterparts for Intel, Apple, Google,
Facebook, or the dozens of large bioscience companies spawned in the United
States. While Fraunhofer spins off companies, most have remained small.
Fraunhofer established seven institutes in the United States and
research subsidiaries in Chile, Austria, Portugal, and Italy. In some cases the
model adapts well to the local innovation system, while in other cases it does
not. It is worth keeping in mind, however, that Fraunhofer also takes a strategic
approach to establishing institutes, funding them partly to learn about
technology development in other parts of the world.
While Fraunhofer's approach does not seem to encourage radical,
paradigm-shattering change, it nonetheless demonstrates that a high-cost,
high-wage country can compete effectively in global markets through the
systematic and continuous application of knowledge.
One source of German success is its
concentrated efforts to support research relevant to small- and medium–size
enterprises that are less likely to move production offshore. Through
Fraunhofer, Germany offers skills, equipment, and services that those companies
could not afford on their own. As a result, Germany has strengthened its
export-oriented manufacturing base and
retained good manufacturing jobs, even though its workers’ wages are
among the highest in the world.
What are the implications for the United States? Perhaps the first
lesson is that German firms are not “home alone.” They are supported by a dense
network of institutes that help them make the incremental improvements
that bring long-term commercial success. A second lesson is that this is seen
as an important national mission, the way national defense is here in the
United States. It requires a steady flow of resources, concentrated effort,
well-funded, well-led institutions, and a sense that these are investments that
are important for the country’s future
There are certainly barriers to U.S. adoption of institutions to
support a manufacturing ecosystem. Ever since the end of World War II, the
United States has invested heavily in basic research in the belief that scientific
advances would lead to new products and industries. For decades, U.S. research
did just that. Yet today, many of those industries, such as wireless and
microelectronics, have migrated overseas, taking jobs and innovators with them.
The dominant post-war paradigm, namely that technologies invented here would
naturally be produced here, has now eroded.
Germany's government has long supported the application of technology
to manufacturing. It launched the nation's industrial revolution by investing in
British machine tools, and closed the gap with the United Kingdom by
encouraging applied research. Its on going support for large-scale practical
industrial research for small and large companies has helped keep factories and
jobs in Germany.
Despite these advantages, few in the
United States would want to adapt a system that would not support the creation
of such breakthrough industries as biotechnology, nanotechnology, and the Internet.
Yet if we are to exploit the opportunities in new manufacturing technologies,
the United States might consider adapting some of Fraunhofer's best practices
to improve the flow of innovation to SMEs, which form the heart of America's
manufacturing infrastructure.
One thing is clear. Countries that lose their manufacturing base risk
losing their ability to innovate. Against the background of an economic
environment which has seen the erosion and offshoring of traditional industries
in the face of global competition, the German model, or some parts of it,
warrants careful consideration. Above all, we have to pay attention to other
countries’ policies and programs and learn from them, just as we have in the
past.